In this article I shall concern myself with the question 'Is some type of justification required in order for belief in God to be rational?' Many philosophers and theologians in the past would have responded affirmatively to this question. However, in our own day, there are those who maintain that natural theology in any form is not necessary. This is because of the rise of a different understanding of the nature of religious belief. Unlike what most people in the past thought, religious belief is not in any sense arrived at or inferred on the basis of other known propositions. On the contrary, belief in God is taken to be as basic as a person's belief in the existence of himself, of the chair in which he is sitting, or the past. The old view that there must be a justification of religious belief, whether known or unknown, is held to be mistaken. One of the most outspoken advocates of this view is Alvin Plantinga.1 According to Plantinga the mature theist ought not to accept belief in God as a conclusion from other things he believes. Rather, he should accept it as basic, as a part of the bedrock of his noetic structure. 'The mature theist commits himself to belief in God; this means that he accepts belief in God as basic. '2 In what follows I would like to examine and question the arguments Plantinga uses to support the view that religious belief ought to be basic in a person's epistemological structure. I will argue that belief in God ought not to be considered as basic because it cannot be. Belief in God is not basic because it is inferred, and thus based on a more basic proposition held to be true by the person doing the believing. In short, I shall maintain that an inference is needed if belief in God is to be considered rational.
Clifford is Plantinga's chief example) position with regard to belief in
is not properly basic. I will try to show that this is the case, not by proposing some criteria which any proposition must meet in order to be properly basic (which is what Plantinga says I must do), but by maintaining that there is another proposition which is properly basic and which is incompatible with belief in God being properly basic. Because of this incompatibility, one or the other cannot be properly basic, and I am contending that it is belief in God which is not so characterized. individuating properties that will ground my assent to his being God, and one or more of these properties will have to be manifested in the revelatory situation. For example, because I believe that God has the property of being a necessary being the manifestation of this property in a revelatory situation will ground my assent to the proposition that God is involved. Thus the Christian theist sees the resurrection ofJesus Christ as having the marks of God's presence because it was impossible to keep Christ in the grave. Or consider the following proposition: 
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